金融危机中国际货币政策协调的有效性分析  

Analysis on the Effectiveness of International Monetary Policy’s Coordination in the Financial Crisis

作　　者：吴军[1] 张弼[1] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学金融学院,北京100029

出　　处：《金融发展研究》2010年第5期3-8,共6页Journal Of Financial Development Research

基　　金：对外经济贸易大学"211工程"三期重点学科建设项目(立项第33036号)资助

摘　　要：本文以2007年以来全球金融危机对新兴市场国家的传导及国际货币政策协调为例,运用博弈论的方法从福利角度比较分析了非合作博弈与合作博弈两种结局,得出协调要优于不协调的结论。分析中发现,对于新兴市场国家而言,其经济实力明显弱于美国,危机冲击和货币政策传导效应的非对称性,决定其很可能陷入由美国主导的斯坦克尔伯格博弈的协调模式,其福利可能不一定优于纳什均衡时的状况。因此,新兴市场经济国家应积极参与国际货币政策协调,但是要避免采取处于尾随地位的斯坦克尔伯格博弈的协调方式。This paper studies the transmission of the global financial crisis from USA to the emerging markets since 2007 and international monetary policy coordination, using game theory to take a comparative analysis of the welfare of non-cooperative solution and cooperative solution, which concluded that the coordination is better than non-coordination. The analysis found that the coordination might become a Stackelberg leadership model due to the relative weaker power of the emerging economies compared to the US economy, which depends on the asymmetric of the crisis shock and effects of monetary policy transmission. As followers, the equilibrium might not dominate the Nash equilibrium for the emerging countries. Therefore, the emerging economies should actively participate in the coordination but try to avoid becoming a follower in a Stackelberg leadership model.

关 键 词：国际金融危机 国际货币政策协调 斯坦克尔伯格博弈 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]