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作 者:孙树垒[1]
机构地区:[1]南京财经大学管理科学与工程学院,江苏南京210046
出 处:《山东理工大学学报(自然科学版)》2010年第2期20-23,共4页Journal of Shandong University of Technology:Natural Science Edition
基 金:江苏省软科学项目(BR2008041)
摘 要:以降低成本型与需求创造型两类创新为基础,建立了具有差异化产品和创新溢出的横向双寡头三阶段博弈模型.对模型均衡结果的分析,揭示了研发合作与研发竞争下双寡头企业的产品定价、研发及产品定位决策行为的特点.分析表明两种类型的创新在差异化产品价格竞争情形下具有相同的经济效果,并指出企业研发具有"囚徒博弈"的特征,在研发合作下研发投入为零.A three-stage model with differential product and innovation spillovers was constructed for two firms in duopoly market based on cost reducing innovation or demand creating innovation. Through analysis of the equilibrium of the model, behavior character of product pricing, R&D and positioning of duopoly in cooperative R&D or non--cooperative R&D is disclosed. It is found that two kinds of innovation have identical economic effect under price competition with differential product. This paper also claims that R&D game of duopoly in essence is a prison game, and R&D level in cooperation will be zero.
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