股权结构与上市公司审计委员会的设立  

OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND AUDIT COMMITTEE FORMATION OF LISTED COMPANIES

作　　者：夏文贤[1] 陈汉文[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学,361005

出　　处：《中国会计与财务研究》2006年第3期40-73,共34页China Accounting and Finance Review

摘　　要：本文基于控股股东与中小股东代理问题的分析，从上市公司自愿设立审计委员会的视角，分析了股权结构与公司监督机制选择的关系。研究结果表明，第一大股东对公司实现绝对控股时，出于对中小股东利益“掠夺”的需要，公司自愿设立审计委员会的可能性显著下降；制衡性股权结构有利公司监督机制的完善，非控股股东持股比例越高，公司设立审计委员会的可能性更大，其中，第二大股东起主导作用。此外，我们还发现，对于非国有股控股公司，其控股股东加强了对公司的控制，公司设立审计委员会的可能性较低。We investigate the relation between ownership structure and monitoring mechanisms from the perspective of the formation of voluntary audit committees based on agency conflict between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. We find that controlling shareholders are more likely to use their power to hold up the formation of audit committees when they have absolute control and incentive to expropriate the minority shareholders. Checks and balances within a firm＇s ownership structure can improve corporate governance. The greater the number of shares held by non-controlling shareholders, the higher the likelihood that an audit committee will be formed. Moreover, we find the likelihood of an audit committee being formed declines significantly when the shares held by the largest shareholder are non-state-owned shares.

关 键 词：审计委员会 股权结构 自愿设立 

分 类 号：F239.45[经济管理—会计学]