基于信号传递模型的风险资本退出的并购定价分析  

An Analysis on Pricing Game of Venture Capital Exiting Through Enterprises Mergers Based on Information Signal Model

作　　者：蒋海[1] 罗瑶[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学金融研究所 [2]暨南大学金融系

出　　处：《管理学报》2010年第6期930-935,共6页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(08JA790056);广东省社会科学基金资助项目(07E04);教育部留学回国人员启动基金资助项目;暨南大学金融研究所资助项目

摘　　要：运用信号传递模型分析了风险投资企业并购的分离均衡和混同均衡及其不同风险资本家类型条件下的并购均衡价格。分析结果表明,风险资本家的预期收益与信号传递成本、其他投资者对风险资本真实价值的判断及其获得并购收益后的后验概率,是影响风险资本并购博弈均衡价格的主要因素,完善风险企业的信息披露制度对解决风险资本退出中的逆向选择问题至关重要。我国两个不同类型的典型案例分析有力地支持了博弈分析结果。This paper analyzes the separated equilibrium and mixed equilibrium of venture capital pricing game and their equilibrium prices in the process of enterprises＇ mergers using information signalling model.The results show that venture capitalists＇ expected return and information signalling cost,and other investors＇ estimation on true value and its posterior probability,are main factors affecting equilibrium prices of these games.Therefore information disclosure system should be highlighted to solve adverse selection in the process of venture capital exiting through enterprises mergers.Meanwhile two typical chinese cases studies are consistent with our theoretical conclusion.

关 键 词：风险投资 企业并购 信号传递博弈 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]