相机授权体制下我国央地关系中的潜规则现象及其矫治--兼谈分税制后“驻京办”问题的实质  

The Phenomenon of Hidden Rules in the Relationship of Central and Local Governments Based on the Opportune Authorization System

作　　者：郭剑鸣[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江财经学院财政与公共管理学院、财政学省重点研究基地,杭州310018

出　　处：《浙江社会科学》2010年第6期25-32,24,共9页Zhejiang Social Sciences

基　　金：教育部人文社科规划项目“行政集权与经济分权体制下政府公关活动潜规则化问题研究--以驻京办为例”(09YJA810022);国家社科基金“基于预算国家建设的我国反腐败模式完善研究”(09ZZB012)的阶段性成果;浙江省高校人文社科重点研究基地“浙江财经学院财政学科”、浙江省高校重点学科“行政管理学”的资助

摘　　要：文章以相机授权体制与财税分权体制的悖论为框架,剖析了蔓延于我国央地关系中的典型的潜规则形态:中央和地方均存在采取非规范的方式与对方互动的偏好。文章认为相机授权体制存在授权透明度和规范度不高的弊端,侵蚀了财税分权后的地方利益,加之我国当前普遍存在的预算软约束的积弊,是央地关系中潜规则现象泛滥的体制原因。而各级各类的"驻京办"则是其中的重要载体。要矫治这种"病态"的央地关系,根本一条是实行制度化授权体制,保障中央对国家核心权力的"透明化集中"和地方对国家非核心权力的"固定式分享"。The article takes the paradox of the opportune authorization system and the finance and taxation decentralization system as its framework,and dissects the typical pattern of hidden rules which is that central and local governments both have preferences to interact with each other in a non-normative way in the relationship between them.According to the article,the drawbacks of low degree of transparency and standard existing in the opportune authorization system corrode local benefits under the condition of finance and taxation decentralization.In addition,soft budget constraint is a prevalent problem in current China.Both of these are the institutional reasons.The various levels and types of 'Beijing Office' are one of the important carriers.The key to cure this abnormal relationship between central and local governments is to build an institutionalized system of authority to ensure that the central government transparently centralizes national core powers and local governments share non-core powers steadily.

关 键 词：相机授权 财税分权 潜规则 驻京办 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学]