拍卖中的合谋与防合谋的最优机制设计:理论与实证研究的新进展  

Collusion in Auctions and the Optimal Collusion-Proof Mechanism Design:New Progress in Theoretical and Empirical Study

作　　者：王宏[1] 陈宏民[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《产业经济研究》2010年第3期85-94,共10页Industrial Economics Research

摘　　要：标准拍卖理论不考虑竞标者合谋,而实际上合谋在标准拍卖中普遍存在并对拍卖结果(包括配置效率、竞标策略、最优保留价格、参与者收益等)有重要影响。最近相关的研究日益增多,目前研究主要关注了各种不同拍卖模式下合谋的难易及其对拍卖结果的影响,对合谋的侦测与控制,防合谋的最优机制设计。本文旨在反映关于拍卖中合谋研究的现状与最新进展,并展望了未来的研究方向。The standard auction theory does not consider the issue of bidder collusion, while in fact collusion is ubiquitous in real auction process and have significant impact on auction outcome （including allocation efficiency, bidding strategy, optimal reserve price, participants＇ revenue and etc. ） Recently there are more and more literatures paying attention to bidder collusion. The present research focus on the effects of different collusion schemes on the auction outcomes, the link between collusion and corruption, the detection and control on collusion, the optimal mechanism design of collusion-proof auctions. The aim of this paper is to give a general literature review on the status quo and latest progress of the research on bidder collusion. We also put forward some future research avenues.

关 键 词：拍卖 合谋 机制设计 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]