信息披露中四方主体双边合谋的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of the Bilateral Collusion among Four Player in the Process of Information Disclosure

作　　者：淮建军[1] 雷红梅[2,3] 

机构地区：[1]西北农林科技大学经济管理学院,陕西杨凌712100 [2]西北农林科技大学校医院,陕西杨凌712100 [3]西安交通大学医学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2010年第12期26-32,共7页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：西北农林科技大学人才专项资金资助项目"媒体报道对信息披露的影响"(22050205)

摘　　要：为了解决信息披露过程中的多个主体合谋损害投资者利益的问题,根据信息披露的过程,采用多人非合作博弈的方法构建了上市公司、媒体、会计事务所和监管机构参与双边合谋的博弈模型,均衡分析发现:每个局中人最优策略选择都取决于实现各自预期效用最大化的临界值.最后根据每个主体决策的临界值提出了治理合谋的政策建议.To resolve the questions that n-players collude with others in the the information disclosure to damage the interest of the main investors , According to the process of information disclosure, using n-player non-cooperative game approach, it constructs the bilateral collusion game model that enterprise, media, accounting firms and regulators participate, equilibrium analysis found that the optimal choices of everyone always lie on their threshold value which maximized their expected utility from these strategies. Suggestion about governing the collusion according to the critical value was given.

关 键 词：信息披露 媒体报道 审计意见 监管 中间层 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]