基于演化博弈的大学生诚信考试研究  

Study on Honest test in University Students Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：李洪波[1] 杨兰[1] 杜建国[1] 杨道建[1] 范明[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学工商管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2010年第12期33-45,共13页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70773051);中国博士后科学基金(20090461080);江苏省教育厅哲学社会科学基金(06SJD710014;08SJD6300005);江苏省高等教育学会"十一五"高等教育科学研究规化课题(JS048);江苏教育科学"十一五"规划课题(C-a/2006/01/026);江苏省高校"青蓝工程"资助;江苏大学拔尖人才培养工程资助

摘　　要：为研究一些要素对大学生诚信考试问题中主体行为演化的影响,借助演化博弈理论这一前沿研究工具,建立了监考教师与考生交互过程的演化模型,研究了各种情形下监考教师和学生行为交互系统均衡点的存在性和稳定性,并用数值仿真展示了决策参数的不同取值和初始条件的改变对演化结果的影响.研究发现:这些影响二者行为的要素作用的大小会影响均衡点的个数及其稳定性,均衡点的稳定性会在源点、汇点和鞍点之间变化,分析表明大学生从不诚信考试中获得的收益过高,对教师不认真监考监督、处罚不力,都可能使系统的演化向不良状态进化,并最终"锁定"于这一状态,并讨论了系统向良好状态演化和跳出不良"锁定"的条件.分析对大学生考试制度的创新和设计指明了方向.In order to research the impact of some factors on the behavior of subject in the course examination of Chinese university students, an evolutionary model on interaction between the teacher supervising and student taking the examination is obtained by adopting a frontier researching tool-evolutionary game theory. Equilibrium points and their stability at different conditions are discussed. The influences of variety of original condition or decisionmaking parameters on the results after evolution are shown by numerical experiments. It is found that the size of the factors＇ function will affect the number and stability of equilibrium points, and each equilibrium will be outflow point, inflow point, or and saddle point, and change between them. The results show that if the university students can obtain too high income, or the punishment strength to halfhearted teacher in examination supervision is low, the system may evolve to bad ＂locked＂ state. We also discuss the condition that the system makes for good state and jump out of the bad ＂locked＂ state. This paper may provide helpful pointers used for innovation and design of institution.

关 键 词：演化博弈 大学生 诚信考试 制度分析与设计 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]