寡头捕鱼策略的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of the Fishing Strategy of Oligarchs

作　　者：高武军[1] 李师煜[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西理工大学理学院,江西赣州341000

出　　处：《江西理工大学学报》2010年第3期77-80,共4页Journal of Jiangxi University of Science and Technology

基　　金：江西理工大学校级课题(08JY61)

摘　　要：存在多个捕捞主体时,分别就完全信息静态博弈模型和完全信息动态博弈模型分析了多个主体为使自身获得最大持续利润而需投入的捕捞努力量.分析显示,与只有一个捕捞主体相比,当存在多个捕捞主体时,总的捕捞努力量将增加,但总的最大持续利润将减少,且平衡状态的鱼量也将减少.Under the assumption that there are more than two fishing oligarchs,the problem is studied that howthe subjects determine their fishing effort in complete information static game model and complete information dynamic game model respectively,with an objective of maximizing the average net profit.The analysis shows that,compared with only one oligarch case,the total fishing effort will increase,but the overall maximum sustainable profit will decrease.The number of fish in the equilibrium state will decrease.

关 键 词：博弈论 最大持续利润 捕捞努力量 完全信息静态博弈模型 完全信息动态博弈模型 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]