中国地方政府投融资平台风险及其防范  

Study on the Risk of Local Government Investment-finance Platform and Risk Prevention

作　　者：路军伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《石家庄经济学院学报》2010年第3期96-100,共5页Journal of Shijiazhuang University of Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金青年项目(09YJC790171)

摘　　要：地方投融资平台的建立和发展是财政机会主义在我国制度背景下的特殊表现,并存在双向羊群效应,这使得中国地方投融资平台在短期内迅速积聚巨大风险,并可能从不同路径传导至中央政府和宏观经济运行层面。为防范这一风险,除应多管齐下克服双向羊群效应,迅速遏制地方政府利用投融资平台的过度融资冲动之外,也应建立克服地方政府财政机会主义的长效机制。The establishment of local government investment-finance platform is an institution innovation under special background in China.Although it makes great contributions to China′s economic development facing international financial crisis, it also leads great risk to our macro economic operation during a short period. In this paper,the writer intends to analyze the reason and mechanism of investment-finance platform from the double views of fiscal opportunism and Herding Behavior.At last,many suggestions are put foreword.

关 键 词：地方政府 投融资平台 风险 财政机会主义 羊群效应 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]