股权分置、公司治理结构与现金股利分配  

Share Splitting,Corporate Governance and Cash Dividends Distribution:Evidence from Listed Companies in China

作　　者：胡国柳[1,2] 黄景贵[1] 蒋顺才 李伟铭[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]海南大学经济与管理学院,海南海口570228 [2]西南财经大学博士后流动站,四川成都610074 [3]财富证券,湖南长沙410005

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2010年第6期26-31,46,共7页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金项目(20060390329);海南省哲学社会科学规划项目(HNSK08-48)

摘　　要：文章以2004-2007年中国上市公司为样本,从代理理论视角对股权分置改革前后我国公司治理与现金股利分配关系进行了理论与实证分析。研究结果表明,我国上市公司第一大股东倾向于现金股利分配,但这种情况在股权分置改革完成后有所改变;第二大股东持股比例、流通股比例以及独立董事人数等与现金股利支付率无关。同时,股改哑变量、盈利能力、成长性、偿债能力、公司规模与现金股利分配的关系可以用代理理论加以解释。Based on a sample of listed companies ranging from 2004 to 2007 in China, this paper made a theoretical and empirical analysis on the relationship between corporate governance and cash dividends distribution in the context of share splitting from the agency theory perspective. Results show that in the context of share splitting, the largest shareholder in Chinese listed companies favored the distribution of cash dividends, but it is not the case any more since share splitting reform ; the shares held by the second largest shareholder, the proportion of outstanding shares as well as the number of independent directors, etc. have nothing to do with the cash dividend payout ratio. Meanwhile, the relationship between RSS （dummy variable） , ROE, MAG, EBITL and cash dividends distribution of Chinese listed companies can be explained by agency theory.

关 键 词：股权分置 公司治理 股利政策 现金股利 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]