节能监管的两种机制及其效率的比较分析  

A Comparative Analysis on Two Energy Saving Supervisory Mechanism and Their Efficiencies

作　　者：黄鑫[1,2] 陶小马[1] 杜增华[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海201804 [2]广西大学机械工程学院,广西南宁530004

出　　处：《财贸研究》2010年第3期88-94,共7页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：广西省社会科学基金项目"广西节能减排对策研究--基于市场的节能证书机制设计"(编号:08CJY003);广西大学科研基金项目"可交易节能证书机制设计研究"(编号:X081031);上海市科技发展基金软科学研究项目"特大型城市低碳化的系统结构研究"(编号:20091112)

摘　　要：不对称性信息下如何诱导企业如实申报自身履行节能义务的状况,减少政府的监管成本,增加社会的福利,是节能监管机制设计的目标。从监管成本的视角出发,运用博弈论建立随机稽查机制和自行申报机制的数学模型,比较分析两种节能监管机制的成本和效率。结果表明,当执行成本无明显差距时,节能自行申报机制较随机稽查机制更能有效减少监管成本、社会成本和企业的稽查成本,提高执行效率。How to motivate companies to accurately report the status of their fulfilling energy conservation,reduce the government′s supervisory costs,and increase social welfare,is to design energy saving supervisory mechanism with asymmetry information.Using game theory,on supervisory costs,the mathematical model of random inspections mechanism and self-reports mechanism is established and the costs and efficiencies of two energy saving supervisory mechanisms are comparatively analyzed.The results demonstrate that self-report mechanism is more effective than random inspections mechanism on reducing supervisory costs,social costs and enterprise inspecting costs,and increasing enforcement efficiency on condition that no significant difference in the implementation cost.

关 键 词：节能 不对称信息 随机稽查机制 自行申报机制 

分 类 号：F206[经济管理—国民经济]