植物品种权交易定价策略的博弈分析  

Analysis on the Pricing Strategies in Plant Variety Rights Transactions by Game Theory

作　　者：满广富[1] 宋霞[1] 周衍平[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东农业大学经济管理学院,泰安271018

出　　处：《农业科技管理》2010年第3期59-62,73,共5页Management of Agricultural Science and Technology

基　　金：国家自然基金项目(70773071);国家社科基金项目(06BJY082);教育部留学归国人员科研启动金项目;山东省三农问题软科学研究基地资助项目

摘　　要：文章基于不完全信息动态博弈中精炼贝叶斯均衡的准分离均衡对植物品种权交易定价策略进行分析,得出交易双方在各自不同情况下的最优选择。分析认为,对于一次独立的交易,植物品种权转让方在其提供的品种权具有高开发价值的情况下,只会选择定高价,而在其提供的品种权具有低开发价值的情况下,会利用信息不对称特性,根据受让方对高定价选择购买的概率大小决定选择定高价或低价,双方博弈的重点就在于转让方对于受让方在其定高价时会选择买的概率的估计;对于连续不断交易,最终却只会存在高开发价值定高价和低开发价值定低价的两种博弈结果。最后,提出实现这种长期博弈均衡结果的对策建议。Based on the dynamic games of incomplete information in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the quasi-separating equilibrium,pricing strategies of plant variety rights transactions were analyzed and the optimal choice of parties in the transaction under different circumstances obtained in the paper.It was pointed out that for an independent transaction,the transferor of plant variety rights would be choose higher price in the case of providing the variety rights with a high development value.In the case of providing the variety rights with low development value,by the use of information asymmetry characteristics,the transferor determined high or low price according to the probability the transferee purchase high-priced the variety rights.For continuous transaction,eventually there were two results,i.e.,the variety rights with high development value were high priced and the variety rights with low development value were low priced.Finally,some suggestions were put forward to achieve this long-run game equilibrium.

关 键 词：植物品种权交易 定价 博弈均衡 

分 类 号：DF523[政治法律—民商法学]