中央政府与地方政府在土地垂直管理制度改革中的利益博弈分析  

Analysis on the Benefit Game Between Central and Local Governments in the Reform of Direct Top-down Land Administration System

作　　者：李名峰[1] 曹阳[2] 王春超[3] 

机构地区：[1]华中师范大学管理学院,湖北武汉430079 [2]华中师范大学经济管理学院,湖北武汉430079 [3]暨南大学经济学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《中国土地科学》2010年第6期9-13,共5页China Land Science

基　　金：2007年度国家社科基金重大招标项目"促进社会公平正义的服务型政府建设和公共服务体系完善研究"(07&ZD030)

摘　　要：研究目的:通过建立古典博弈模型,分析土地垂直管理制度改革过程中地方政府与中央政府的利益博弈关系,为土地管理制度的进一步完善提出政策建议。研究方法:古典博弈分析。研究结果:中国土地垂直管理制度改革分两步进行,是中央政府与地方政府经过利益博弈、相互妥协的结果。为了减少改革的阻力,中央政府应该对地方政府因制度改革受损的利益进行补偿。研究结论:中央政府在推进土地垂直管理制度改革的同时,还应从"开源"和"节流"两方面进行土地管理制度的配套改革。The purpose of this paper is via the establishment of a classical game model to analyze the benefit game between central and local governments in the reform of direct top-down land administration system so as to put forward policy recommendations for the further improvement of land administration system. Method employed is classical game analysis. The results indicate： （1）there should be two steps for completion of the reform of direct top-down land administration system in China, which is determined by the benefit game and mutual compromise of central and local governments; （2）in order to reduce the reform resistance, central government should compensate the local governments for their beneficial loss due to the reform. It is concluded that in the meantime of propelling the reform of direct top-down land administration system, the central government should also conduct supplemented reform on the land administration system basing on the principles of ＂increase the revenue＇and ＂decrease the expenditure＂.

关 键 词：土地管理 垂直管理 博弈论 制度变迁 

分 类 号：F301.2[经济管理—产业经济]