高校成果转化办公室激励契约设计分析  

Analysis on the Incentive Contract Design of University Achievements Commercialization Offices

作　　者：李梅芳[1] 刘国新[1] 闫俊周[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学管理学院,武汉430070

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报》2010年第12期143-147,共5页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70772074);国家社会科学基金(BIA090049);武汉市软科学项目(200940833375-03)

摘　　要：基于委托-代理理论,构建了高校成果转化办公室激励契约模型,探讨了高校与高校成果转化办公室之间的最优激励契约。结果表明,高校成果转化办公室的工作能力、工作意愿、风险规避度以及外界不确定性因素等对契约的设计具有重要影响,高校科技成果的转化效率与高校成果转化办公室的工作能力成平方正向增长关系,与其努力工作的意愿成正比,与其风险规避程度和外界不确定性因素成反比,同时,信息不对称条件下高校成果转化办公室的工作努力水平严格小于对称信息下的努力水平。Based on principal-agent theory,an incentive contract model of university achievements commercialization offices（UACO） was constructed in this paper,and an optimal incentive contract between university and UACO was researched into.The conclusion indicates that many factors,such as working ability,working willingness,risk aversion degree of UACO,as well as the outside uncertain factors and so on,have important influences on the contract design.The efficiency of commercialization of university inventions has a squared forward growth relation with working ability,a direct proportion with working willingness,and has an inverse proportion with risk aversion degree of UACO and with outside uncertainty.Additionally,the level of hard working of UACO under the condition of information asymmetry is strictly less than that of information symmetry.

关 键 词：高校成果转化办公室 成果转化 委托-代理 激励契约 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]