国际铁矿石定价与中国钢铁企业语语权缺失  

The Reasons and Countermeasures for China’s Losing Say in the International Iron Ore Negotiations

作　　者：吴其勉[1] 陈炳枝[1] 

机构地区：[1]福建师范大学经济学院,福建福州350108

出　　处：《福建金融管理干部学院学报》2010年第3期27-32,共6页Journal of Fujian Institute of Financial Administrators

摘　　要：在历年的铁矿石谈判中,中国企业几乎失去了最大需求方应有的"话语权"。垄断价格形成模型和"囚徒困境"是我国企业丧失"话语权"的原因,并据此提出加强与日本、韩国的合作,结成价格谈判联盟;利用市场份额,分化卖方的寡头联盟;积极参与新的铁矿石定价体系发展铁矿石期货市场;开发国内外铁矿石资源,提高铁矿石资源掌控力;逐渐提高我国国内钢铁企业的集中度以及规范铁矿石进口企业等增强我国铁矿石企业谈判中"话语权"的对策。In the iron ore negotiations in past years, China almost lost the ＂voice＂ that the country should have, as the greatest needs. The losing of ＂voice＂ makes the profits of steal industry shrink, even vaporize. This paper analyzes the trade structure of the international iron ore market, the formation of price of iron ore monopoly, the reason of loss of ＂voice＂ based on the domestic and international perspective, sand propose some solutions to increase the power of China’s iron ore negotiations from different angles by applying the economic model of monopoly price formation and the principle of ＂prisoner’s dilemma＂ to discuss the loss of ＂voice＂, which contains forming price alliance with Japan, Korea, disintegrating supplier monopoly, developing future market for iron ore, exploiting mines home and abroad, integrating and coordinating domestic demand forces.

关 键 词：铁矿石博弈 话语权 囚徒困境 

分 类 号：F752.65[经济管理—国际贸易]