保险产品创新的博弈:理论综述及政策建议  

Game Analyses of Insurance Product Innovation:Theoretical Review and Policy Advice

作　　者：林伟光[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学经济学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《华南农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2010年第3期99-103,共5页Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)

摘　　要：保险业竞争已趋于"白热化",创新型的保险产品也日益成为保险公司新的业务增长点。文章通过博弈模型,分析保险公司在进行产品创新过程中是选择创新,还是模仿的动因,分析纳什均衡条件,明确产品创新中"搭便车者"的存在,我国保险企业在产品创新上形成智猪博弈,根据博弈分析结果提出针对性建议。Insurance competition has been heating up, innovative insurance products has become the new business growth source. This paper mainly focuses on the analysis of the motivation of insurance companies, to figure out whether they desire to innovate or to imitate when they innovate new products by game theory. From the result of game analyses, we verily the free rider in the products innovation. Finally, we bring up some policy suggestions according to the analysis and conclusions.

关 键 词：保险产品 创新 智猪博弈 

分 类 号：F840.32[经济管理—保险]