农民工与企业的博弈——我国农民工工资水平形成研究  

The Game Between Rural-to-Urban Migrants and Enterprises——The Formation of the Level of Rural-to-Urban Migrants' Wage in China

作　　者：彭红碧[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学经济学院 [2]四川教育学院经贸系

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2010年第7期116-122,共7页Research on Economics and Management

摘　　要：我国农民工工资水平形成于农民工与企业的博弈过程中,其高低取决于双方的博弈力量。农民工在宏观、中观、微观三个层面的弱势性决定了其相对博弈力量几乎为零,其工资水平处于较低的位置,并呈现出扭曲性偏低的特征。这是我国城乡分割和重城轻乡制度安排的必然结果,而改革传统的城乡制度安排、消除农民工博弈力量的制度约束、使其工资水平真正成为市场机制作用的结果则是提高农民工工资水平的政策出路。The level of rural-to-urban migrants＇ wage is formed in the process of the game between rural-to-urban Migrants and enterprises and depends on both sides＇ game strength. But the weakness of rural-to-urban migrants from the macro, medium and micro levels determines that their relative game strength is almost zero. The polley suggestion is reforwing the traditional urban-rural system arrangement so as to eliminate institutional constraints force of rural-to-urban migrants＇game and determine the wage level by the market mechanism.

关 键 词：农民工工资 博弈弱势 低水平 制度性扭曲 

分 类 号：F244[经济管理—劳动经济]