存货质押业务中银行对第三方物流的激励契约设计  

Design of Bank's Incentive Contract with TPL Providers in Inventory Financing

作　　者：韦燕[1] 孙朝苑[1] 帅斌[2] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054 [2]西南交通大学交通运输学院,四川成都610054

出　　处：《物流技术》2010年第12期73-77,共5页Logistics Technology

摘　　要：在信息不对称情况下,运用委托代理理论,研究存货质押贷款业务中银行对第三方物流的激励设计,并将其归结为一个随机二层规划问题,求出了该问题的解并得到一个激励判别不等式。通过对激励判别不等式进行分析,解决了银行面临的需要激励第三方物流付出哪种努力水平,以及当第三方物流选择这种努力水平时,银行相应激励合同的设计问题。The paper studies the drawing of incentive contracts by the banks concerning TPL providers based on inventory financing using principal-agent theory under the constraint of information asymmetry,then formulates it as a stochastic bi-level programming problem,and obtains its solution as well as an incentive discriminant inequality equation.Through analyzing the inequality equation,the paper concludes on the effort levels of the banks in encouraging TPL providers and the design of corresponding incentive contract for each effort level.

关 键 词：存货质押 委托-代理 激励契约 第三方物流 

分 类 号：F224.0[经济管理—国民经济] F274