不同博弈构式下三寡头差异化竞争和歧视定价策略  

Analysis of Price and Differentiation Strategies in Triopoly Market with different Game Structures

作　　者：巩永华[1] 李帮义[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210016

出　　处：《系统工程》2010年第4期59-63,共5页Systems Engineering

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金资助项目(09YJA630064);江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新基金资助项目(CX08B-040R)

摘　　要：内生地考虑三寡头市场垄断力的不同情形,基于Salop环形城市模型,首先研究不同博弈构式下基于单一价格策略的差异化策略,接着分析企业对歧视定价策略的选择。研究表明:企业实施单一定价策略时,Bertrand-Nash博弈均衡为三企业之间遵循最大差异化原则,均匀分布于整个市场;而Bertrand-Stackelberg博弈达到均衡时,Salop模型退化为Hotelling模型,表现为两个挑战企业发生集聚,与领导企业分别居于线段的两端,而且领导企业更愿争取先动优势,作价格制定的领导者而不是追随者。当实施歧视定价策略时,企业利润明显提高,对产品差异化和价格决策先行权的依赖缓解,三企业选择歧视定价的意愿均增强。Based on the Salop model with endogenous market power,price and differentation strategies under Bertand-Nash and Bertrand-Stackelberg game structures are sdudied.The results show that when uniform pricing is chosen three firms obey ＂maximized defferention＂ principle under Bertrand-Nash game structure. Bertrand-Stackelberg model will degenerate to be Hotelling model,in which the equiliabrium is the two late-movers agglomerate and at one of the end of the lines with the first-mover.The leading firm prefer to price rather than follow.When discrimination pricing is chosen the profit is improved and the dependence on differentation and prcing in advance are relieved,which will encourage more firms to choose discriminatory pricing.

关 键 词：三寡头垄断 决策规则 歧视定价 差异化策略 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]