近代中国钱业制度内生性的进化博弈分析——以上海钱业公会为视角  

Analysis of Evolution Game of Modern China's Endogenous Financial System——Based on the Perspective of Shanghai Financial Association

作　　者：魏忠[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海金融学院国际金融学院,上海201209

出　　处：《重庆工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2010年第4期54-59,共6页Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University：Social Science Edition

摘　　要：由钱业惯例和习俗转变形成的上海钱业制度通行全国。本文运用进化博弈理论,从内生性的角度研究近代上海钱业制度。在自由型市场中,上海钱业制度是市场动态稳定均衡的结果,是可自我实施和自我维持的内生制度;钱业公会是其中的一个制度要素,是一种有效的制度安排。Shanghai financial system emanating from financial convention and custom transformation is popular in the whole China.This paper uses evolution game theory to study modern Shanghai financial system from endogenous perspective.In free-style market,Shanghai financial system results from market＇s dynamic stability equilibrium and is an endogenous system with self-implementation and self-maintenance.Financial association is one of systematic factors and is a kind of effective systematic arrangement.

关 键 词：金融 内生性 进化博弈 钱业公会 

分 类 号：F832.0[经济管理—金融学]