经理报酬棘轮效应与相对业绩评价模型的选择  

Ratchet Effect of Compensation and the Choice of Relative Performance Evaluation

作　　者：肖继辉[1] 彭文平[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院 [2]华南师范大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2010年第7期993-999,共7页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学青年资助项目(08JC630030);广东省人文社会科学基地重大项目(粤财教[2009]400);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(10JYB2034)

摘　　要：通过对上市公司总经理报酬与公司业绩关系的实证检验,发现净资产收益率和股票回报率对报酬有显著的正向影响,但报酬与业绩间不敏感。导致报酬与业绩间缺乏敏感性的原因之一是报酬棘轮效应的存在。检验了报酬棘轮效应的存在与方式,发现基于同行业同规模企业加总股票回报业绩的报酬棘轮效应存在,运用基于同行业同规模企业加总股票回报业绩作为参照业绩的相对业绩评价模型,可以避免棘轮效应的影响,提高报酬契约激励效率。In this paper,we make empirical analysis of the relationship between general manager＇s compensation and performance of corporation,and found out that ROE and RET have significant positive effect on compensation;however,there are lack of sensitivity between compensation and performance.We argue that the existence of ratchet effect is one of the reasons that result in the lack of sensitivity of compensation and performance.In addition,we exam the existence and way of ratchet effect and found out that the ratchet effect based on aggregate stock price performance of business with same size and industry does not exist.We conclude that the application of RPE model,in which the chosen referring performance is aggregate performance of the business of same size and industry,can avoid the influence of ratchet effect on general manager＇s compensation contract and increase the efficiency of compensation contract.

关 键 词：报酬 棘轮效应 相对业绩评价 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]