刍议发电侧电力市场的默契合谋与规制  

On Tacit Collusion and Regulation of Power Generation-side Market

作　　者：李美娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2010年第7期88-92,共5页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：发电侧电力市场所具有的无限重复拍卖特征,这会使得参与市场竞争的发电商之间有可能形成默契合谋。基于无限重复非合作博弈理论分析可发现,当贴现因子满足一定条件时,发电商能够在垄断价格水平下维持默契合谋报价,从而影响电力市场的有效运营,必须对其加以规制。规制部门可对参与合谋的发电商实施适当强度经济制裁负激励,规定发电商报价的上限或下限,以及合理安排发电侧电力市场的信息披露等方法,对发电侧电力市场的默契合谋进行有效规制。The characteristics of infinitely repeated auction make the power companies likely form tacit collusion in power generation-side market.Based on infinitely repeated non-cooperative game theory,the power companies can maintain tacit collusion under the monopoly price level when the discount factor satisfies certain condition,which affects the normal and efficient operation in the electricity market.therefore,the tacit collusion must be regulated.Regulatory departments carry out effective regulation by implementing appropriate economic sanctions involved in conspiracy generators,providing the maximum or minimum limits of bids,and reasonably arranging for information disclosure of power generation-side markets.

关 键 词：发电市场 默契合谋 规制 

分 类 号：F124.5[经济管理—世界经济]