战略委员会与上市公司过度投资行为  

Strategy Committee and Overinvestment Behavior of Listed Companies

作　　者：覃家琦[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学商学院,天津300071

出　　处：《金融研究》2010年第6期124-142,共19页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：教育部人文社科项目(09YJC630134);国家自然科学基金项目(70902048);南开大学亚洲研究中心项目(AS0914)资助

摘　　要：本文尝试引进超效率数据包络分析法来度量公司过度投资水平,并以2006～2008年中国制造业上市公司为样本,实证检验了战略委员会的设立及特征对上市公司过度投资水平的影响。研究表明:样本公司存在明显的过度投资行为;设立战略委员会的样本公司其过度投资水平显著更高;战略委员会的规模、独立董事比例、平均任期、董事长是否担任战略委员会负责人这四个因素与过度投资水平显著正相关,而平均学历、平均年龄则与过度投资水平显著负相关;战略委员会不存在内生性问题,样本公司设立战略委员会更多的是迎合监管部门的要求。In this paper, we attempt to introduce the approach of super efficiency DEA （ data envelopment analysis） to measure the overinvestment level of listed companies, and empirically test the effect of the set-up of strategy committee and its other characteristics on the overinvestment level of those listed companies based on China＇s listed companies of manufacturing industry from 2006 to 2008. The results show that there are substantial overinvestment behavior in the sample companies and the companies with strategy committee have significantly higher overinvestment level. The scale, independent directors rate, average tenure, combination of board chairman and leader of strategy committee have significant positive effect on overinvestment level, but average education level and average age have significant negative effect. The set-up of strategy committee is not an endogenous variable, and for the sample companies, the main reason to set up strategy committee is to cater for the requirement of regulation sector.

关 键 词：战略委员会 过度投资 数据包络分析 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51