我国煤矿企业安全监管的内外部博弈分析  

Internal and External Game Analysis on Safety Supervision in China’s Coal Mine Enterprises

作　　者：李爽[1] 宋学锋[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《中国矿业大学学报》2010年第4期610-616,共7页Journal of China University of Mining & Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70871113);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(08JA630083);教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(07JA630025);中国矿业大学青年科研基金项目(2009A033)

摘　　要：通过对我国煤矿企业安全监管中各相关者的收益和损失分析,构建了各利益相关者的收益函数,运用静态和动态博弈分析方法,研究了监管机构与煤矿企业、安全管理部门与生产部门之间的合作博弈行为,以及实现博弈均衡的条件.结果表明:各利益相关者的物质和精神收益,导致了在安全监管和生产中的博弈;采取加大对双方的违规处罚和降低重视安全管理的成本等措施可调整各方的期望收益,减少监管和生产的违规行为.结合辽宁省孙家湾煤矿特大瓦斯爆炸事故的案例分析,为我国煤矿企业内外部安全监管提供了对策.Based on the analysis of revenue and loss of all stakeholders in the safety supervision in China’s coal mine enterprises,a revenue function of all stakeholders was proposed.The cooperated behavioral game between supervisory authorities and coal mine enterprises,and safety management department and production department were studied using static and dynamic game theories.The conditions to achieve a balanced game were obtained.The results indicate that the substantial and mental gains of all stakeholders result in games in the safety supervision and production.All expected revenue can be adjusted by increasing deregulation punishment towards supervision and production,and reducing costs of safety management,etc.Finally,a case study of the serious gas explosion accident of Sunjiawan Coal Mine in Liaoning province was carried cut,and the countermeasures were presented for internal and external safety supervision in China’s coal mine erterprises.

关 键 词：煤矿 安全监管 博弈分析 瓦斯爆炸事故 

分 类 号：X92[环境科学与工程—安全科学] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]