竞争的闭环供应链回收渠道的演化博弈决策  

Reverse channel decision for competition closed-loop supply chain based on evolutionary game

作　　者：韩小花[1] 薛声家[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学管理学院,广东广州510520 [2]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510630

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2010年第7期1487-1493,共7页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(09YJC630037);广东工业大学博士基金资助项目(093036)~~

摘　　要：为提高闭环供应链的运作效率,在竞争的制造商共用一个强势零售商的市场结构下,应用演化博弈对闭环供应链回收渠道的决策进行了分析。研究表明,制造商之间的竞争程度、废旧产品回收的难易程度和再制造成本的节约共同影响回收渠道的演化结果;政府通过实施补贴政策可以促使制造商都选择直接回收渠道的演化稳定策略,更有利于消费者和社会。In order to increase operational efficiency, the reverse channel decision was studied based on evolutionary game in the closed-loop supply chain with competitive manufactures and one dominant retailer. Results indicated that the competition among manufacturers, the collection difficulty and remanufacturing cost saving influenced the evolution result of reverse channel together. And by adopting subsidy policy, government encouraged manufacturers to choose direct reverse channel, which was more benefit to customers and society.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 竞争 强势零售商 回收渠道 演化博弈 决策 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]