制造商统一定价下的最优营销努力与渠道选择  

Channel Choice and Sales Effort Decisions under Manufacturer＇s Uniform Pricing

作　　者：刘向东[1] 郑晓娜[1] 雷明[1] 陈丽华[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院

出　　处：《营销科学学报（辑刊）》2009年第2期72-95,共24页Journal of Marketing Science

摘　　要：本文研究了当（1）需求既受价格，也受销售渠道营销投入的影响；（2）产品最终售价由制造商统一控制的情况下，制造商的渠道选择策略。研究发现，当制造商在直销渠道的运营效率比较高时，它偏好双渠道策略。在一定条件下，如零售商的营销效率较高，其支付的批发价格相对较低，或所得的需求比例较高时，零售商也可能偏好双渠道结构。但值得指出的是，制造商和零售商预先协商的批发价相对零售价的比例对二者利润的影响比较复杂，因而二者在批发价格比率上的谈判要谨慎。We investigate the manufacturer＇s channel choice when it faces end demand that not only dependents on price but on channel members＇ sales effort. In addition, the manufacturer controls the manufacturer suggested retail price （MSRP）. We find that when the manufacturer＇s operating cost at the direct channel is low,he prefers the dual-channel strategy. Under certain conditions, e. g. , when the retailer＇s marketing efficiency is high, the whole price is relatively low,or the demand proportion that goes to the retail channel is relatively large, the retailer benefits from the dual- channel structure as well. However, we find that the wholesale price to retail price ratio, which is pre-set through negotiation,may have complex （non-monotone） impacts on the manufacturer and retailer＇s profits. Therefore, we suggest that the two firms take caution when negotiating on the wholesale-retail price ratio.

关 键 词：统一定价 制造商建议售价 营销努力 双渠道 供应链 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学]