政府换届、经济政策与政治经济周期  

Government Rotation,Economic Policy and Political Business Cycle

作　　者：陈卫东[1] 苗文龙[2,3] 

机构地区：[1]西北政法大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710063 [2]西南财经大学中国金融研究中心,四川成都610074 [3]中国人民银行西安分行,陕西西安710075

出　　处：《经济经纬》2010年第4期14-19,共6页Economic Survey

摘　　要：在梳理政治经济周期理论的基础上,比较中西方国家该理论前提、内在逻辑的差异,并从实际出发提出相关命题,建立计量模型,运用中国1953年～2008年的年度数据进行实证研究。结果表明,"两会"召开周期(中央政府换届)与经济波动周期之间存在较显著的相关性;中央政府换届导致地方政府交流周期,政绩考核晋升机制使地方政府产生纵向、横向上的竞争,并形成周期性的经济发展举措,进而加大了对经济周期的影响;中央政府政治周期使财政政策、货币政策具有一定的顺周期特征,地方政府通过财政项目竞争、软预算约束以及货币信贷倒逼机制,扩大了财政政策、货币政策的顺周期性;在受到国际经济危机异常冲击时,我国财政政策、货币政策表现出平稳经济波动的特征。On the basis of the theories of political business cycle, the authors compare the differences in the theoretical premise and inherent logic between China and western countries, advance relevant proposition, construct the computation model, and make an empirical research with the data of Chinese economy from 1953 to 2008. The findings indicate the correlation is prominent between rotation of government and business cycle ; the rotation of central government leads to the cycle of the rotation of regional government, promotion based achievements leads to vertical and horizontal competition between local governments and forms cyclic economic development measures and has greater effect on economic cycle; the political cycle of central government induces the pro cyclicality character of fiscal policy and monetary policy; the regional government enlarges the pro cyclicality of fiscal policy and monetary policy through the mechanisms of fiscal item competition, soft budget constraint and pressure mechanism of monetary credit; during the term of international economic crisis, the fiscal policy and monetary policy of our country show the characteristics of mild economic fluctuation.

关 键 词：政治经济周期 换届交流 晋升激励 经济政策顺周期 

分 类 号：F037.1[经济管理—政治经济学]