经理人长期激励方案与股东利益的一致性研究  

A Study on the Alignment between Shareholder Benefits and Manager's Long Term Incentive Schemes

作　　者：傅元略[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学会计发展研究中心,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2010年第4期38-42,47,共6页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70872096);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地基金(07JJD630008)

摘　　要：基于EVA(经济增加值)设计长期激励契约和激励比率,引导经理适度举债经营和投资决策能使双方利益趋于一致问题而建立的3个命题进行的逻辑推理证明:(1)在新兴的中国资本市场,高管激励机制不要盲目搬用西方激励方法,长期激励方案具有引导经理准确应用融资优序理论并适度举债,既能激励经理更为努力工作,又能将经理利益与股东利益更紧密融合在一起;(2)合理确定长期激励比率和建立适当的奖励薪酬金额上下限模型,为具体设计激励方案提供理论依据;(3)长激励方案能引导经理的投资决策选择投资项目的条件与股东财富最大化一致。This paper examines how to design long term compensation schemes and incentive ratio based upon economic add value with accumulated bonus so that there is a benefit alignment between agents and shareholders,and how to set up some models for describing those relations between debt financing and agents＇ incentive and the protection of shareholder benefits in financing decision and investment decision.By testing the three propositions in the paper,these are concluded that：（1） the compensation schemes in Proposition 1 would guide agents（CEO and CFO） to increase suitably debt financing,it not only increase the long term bonus present value of manager,but also align managers benefits increase with shareholder wealth maximization;（2） the theoretical and practical base for calculating the rational incentive ratio can be the model proposed in this paper;（3） the compensation schemes can induce agents to take investment decisions consistent with the maximization of shareholder value independently of their preferences.

关 键 词：经理人长期激励方案 股东利益 一致性 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]