基于制造商竞争的闭环供应链回收渠道的决策分析  

Decision Analysis of Recycling Channel of Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on Manufacturer's Competition

作　　者：韩小花[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学管理学院,广东广州510520

出　　处：《系统工程》2010年第5期36-41,共6页Systems Engineering

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09YJC630037);广东工业大学博士基金资助项目(093036)

摘　　要：为了提高回收渠道决策的效率,主要采用Stackelberg博弈,在竞争的制造商共用零售商的市场结构下,研究了闭环供应链回收渠道的决策过程。经过分析论证得出:制造商之间的竞争程度是闭环供应链回收渠道决策的主要影响因素;当竞争程度较低时,制造商选择零售商间接回收废旧产品,竞争程度较高时,制造商选择不回收废旧产品。To improve the decision efficiency of reverse channel, the reverse channel decision of the closed-loop supply chain is studied based on Stackelberg game under the competitive manufactures-common retailer markets. Some conclusions are drawn from the analysis： （1） that the degree of the competition between manufactures is the main influential factor of the decision results of reverse channel; （2） that manufacturers choose the indirect recycling channel when the degree of competition is low, but manufacturers choose not to recycle waste products when the degree is high.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 竞争 共用零售商 回收渠道 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]