集体行动、利益博弈与村庄公共物品供给——岳村公共物品供给困境及其实践逻辑  

Collective Action,Interest Game and Supply of Village Public Goods——Dilemma in the Supply of Public Goods in YUE Village and its Practice Logic

作　　者：陈潭[1] 刘建义[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学公共政策与地方治理研究中心,长沙410012

出　　处：《公共管理学报》2010年第3期1-9,共9页Journal of Public Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(06BZZ035);教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"(NCET-07-0858)

摘　　要：公共物品供给匮乏是当前村庄发展中所直面的现实问题,成为阻碍新农村建设的基础性因素。但传统政府供给职能的萎缩和市场供给有限形态的存在,使得以"一事一议"为代表的村庄集体供给成为重要补充,然而实践表明村庄公共物品供给依然存在困境。村民个体理性逐渐觉醒,成为村庄公共事务管理主体,开始寻求资源有限背景下的自我利益最大化。通过岳村调查发现,村民理性表现为集体成本分担意愿,并呈现从弱到强的变化态势,集体行动的奥尔森困境则表现为投机行为泛滥、精英剥夺严重、公共选择趋于瘫痪等。重构乡村社会资本、实施"有偿"供给、政府财政介入、构建小集团供给模式成为走出村庄公共物品供给的奥尔森困境的可能选择。Lack of public goods is a practical problem which villages are facing in their current development, and is also the basic obstacle to new rural construction. However,due to the shrinkage of traditional government's supply function and the fact that market supply is limited,the village collective supply,which is represented by the 'One Project One Discussion',has become an important supplement. But the practice shows that the supply of village public goods remains difficult. As main body in public affairs management,villagers have become increasingly rational and began to seek for maximizing self-interest in the context of limited resources. Through the survey in YUE Village,we found that villagers' rationality mainly shows on the will of cost-sharing for collective actions,which changes from weak to strong. There is Olson dilemma of collective actions,such as the rampant of speculation plight,the serious deprivation by the elite,and the paralysis trend for public choice. Reconstruction of rural social capital,implementation of the 'paid' supply,government financial intervention and the construction of small groups supply model could be our choices to solve the Olson dilemmas in the supply of village public goods.

关 键 词：集体行动 利益博弈 理性选择 公共物品 

分 类 号：F323[经济管理—产业经济]