主权债务重组方法的选择--基于管制暗示理论的思考  

Choice of Sovereign Debt Restructuring Approaches

作　　者：李仁真[1] 杨方[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《武汉大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2010年第4期486-491,共6页Wuhan University Journal：Philosophy & Social Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金2009年度重点研究项目(09AFX004)

摘　　要：主权债务重组方法经历了从一致行动条款占据主导地位再到集体行动条款成为主流的历史选择过程。集体行动条款之所以成为主权债务重组方法的现实选择,是因为其相对于一致行动条款具有制度优越性,而较之于法定方法更具现实可行性,同时也与晚近主权债务市场的结构变化及现实需要息息相关;基于管制暗示理论来分析,有关国家和国际机构向主权债务市场及其当事人发出的各种管制暗示是一个重要因素。主权债务重组方法的未来选择应该注重管制暗示的作用,公共机构可以通过管制暗示促使主权债务人和债权人进行有效选择。There is a historical stage during choice of sovereign debt restructuring approaches, i. e. the stage from unanimous action clause to collective action clause. There are several reasons why collective action clause has become the primary approach of sovereign debt restructuring. Compared with unanimous action clause, it has institutional advantage in solving problems of collective action and minority holdouts. It is more realizable than statutory approach, while it is also concerning the actual structure and demand of sovereign debt market. By the regulatory cues theory, important function of regulatory cues should be valued for choice of sovereign debt restructuring approaches, while public authorities may propel debtors and creditors choose the efficient approaches in the future.

关 键 词：主权债务重组 集体行动条款 管制暗示 

分 类 号：F831.6[经济管理—金融学]