实际控制人政治身份、自律型治理与审计需求——基于IPO前民营化上市公司的经验证据  

The Ultimate Controlling Owners' Political Status,Self-discipline Corporate Governance and Audit Demand——Evidence from Chinese private listed firms privatized before IPO

作　　者：潘克勤[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南财经政法大学会计学院,450002

出　　处：《审计研究》2010年第4期57-65,共9页Auditing Research

基　　金：教育部人文社科研究2009年度一般项目(09YJAZH027)的资助成果

摘　　要：实际控制人政治身份形成的政治关联与一般高管层的政治关联对于公司治理的影响应该是不同的,实际控制人具备政治身份会促进公司自律进而提升独立审计需求。本文采用实证分析方法,考察了IPO前民营化上市公司实际控制人政治身份与审计需求的关系。研究发现:具有此类政治关联的公司倾向于选择大型审计师,在选择大型审计师后支付了相对较高的审计定价,上述现象均随着实际控制人政治身份级别提高而加强;实际控制人具备政治身份的公司在聘请大型审计师后,其财务报告操控性应计明显下降。上述发现说明,实际控制人具备政治身份的民营上市公司存在信号传递的审计需求,同时大型审计师在此类公司也起到一定监督作用。The different kinds of political connections have different impacts on corporate governance, and political connections from the ultimate controlling owners＇ political status would improve the self-discipline of the corporate governance. Using the positive research approach, this paper analyses the relationship of the ultimate controlling owners＇ political status and the external audit demand. It finds that, the politically connected finns are apt to choose big auditors, and they pay more audit fees for the big auditors, and the higher the level of political status, the stronger the above effects. It also finds that, if the politically connected finns have engaged big auditors, the quality of financial statements would be improved. It states that, the politically connected finns have the audit demand for signaling, at the same time, the big auditors really play supervision role on the financial statements. In summary, the politically connected firms have strong self-discipline incentive to safeguard political reputation and competition advantages, and the self-discipline incentive further improves the external audit demand.

关 键 词：实际控制人 政治身份 审计师规模 审计定价 操控性应计 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]