政治联系、私人关系、事务所选择与审计合谋  

Political Connection,Private Relationship,Choice of Audit Firm and Audit Conspiracy

作　　者：刘启亮[1] 周连辉[2] 付杰[1] 肖建[3] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,430072 [2]西南政法大学政治与公共事务学院 [3]厦门大学管理学院

出　　处：《审计研究》2010年第4期66-77,共12页Auditing Research

基　　金：教育部课题(项目批准号:08JC630060)的阶段性成果之一

摘　　要：本文从政治联系角度研究私人关系的形成原因以及政治联系和私人关系之间的合谋可能借助于哪类事务所来实现。研究发现:首先,客户的政治联系是私人关系产生的一个主要原因,政治联系越强,越可能产生密切的私人关系;其次,政治联系和私人关系的合谋主要借助于小事务所来实现,政治联系的强度越大则越可能选择中国本土的小事务所。此外,本文为合谋理论也提供了相关的经验证据,发现政治联系和私人关系之间的合谋会给客户带来更好的审计意见和更大的盈余管理空间。本文的发现对监管部门具有一定的实践指导意义。This paper investigates the impact of political connection on private relationship and the type of audit firm which takes part in the audit conspiracy between political connection and private relationship. First, we find that client＇s political connection is an important factor where private relationship is formed, and the stronger the political connection, the easier the private relation is formed. Second, the audit conspiracy between political connection and private relationship exists in the domestic small audit t-u-m, furtherly, the stronger the political connection, the easier the domestic small audit firm is chosen. In addition, we also provide some evidence about the audit conspiracy. We find that the client obtain better audit opinion and larger earning management through the conspiracy. The results are helpful for regulators.

关 键 词：政治联系 私人关系 事务所选择 审计质量 审计合谋 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学]