控制权收益与超控制权收益——基于企业能力理论的视角  

Benefits of Control and Excessive Benefits of Control:from the Perspective of Business Capabilities

作　　者：刘立燕[1] 熊胜绪[2] 

机构地区：[1]江汉大学商学院,湖北武汉430056 [2]中南财经政法大学工商管理学院,湖北武汉430064

出　　处：《经济与管理》2010年第8期74-78,92,共6页Economy and Management

摘　　要：多数文献将控制权收益定性为控股股东对中小股东利益的侵害,是一种掏空公司的行为。从企业能力理论视角来说,控股股东是基于其独特的组织资源和能力获取控制权收益,这种收益具有合理性,它是对控制性股东卓越组织能力的回报以及在组织过程中对控制权成本的补偿。而超控制权收益则是控股股东组织能力之外的滥用权力和钻法律漏洞所获得的一种非生产性回报,不具有系统性和可持续性,表现为对中小股东和其他利益相关者的侵害和掠夺。对控股股东侵害的规制,应在保护其合理控制权收益的基础上遏制其超控制权收益。Most researches define the benefits of control as the expropriation on minority shareholders by controlling shareholders. Based on the theory of business capabilities, the controlling shareholders gain from its specific and unique organizing resources and capabilities, which are rational benefits of control, the return to the outstanding organization capability and the compesation to the control cost; while the excessive benefits of control is the expropriation of minority shareholders by abusing legal deficiencies and the controlling right beyond the controlling shareholders capabilities, and is unsustainable which shows the infringe on the medium-and-small shareholders. So to reduce controlling shareholders excessive benefits of control, we should limit the excessive benefits of control based on the protection of their rational benefits of control.

关 键 词：控制权收益 超控制权收益 企业能力理论 

分 类 号：F425[经济管理—产业经济]