排污权交易初始分配中的权利配置与救济  

Configuration and Relief of the Initial Assignment Rights in Tradable Emissions Rights

作　　者：宋晓丹[1,2] 温尚杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京信息工程大学公共管理学院,江苏南京210044 [2]中南财经政法大学法学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《中国环境管理干部学院学报》2010年第4期28-30,38,共4页Journal of Environmental Management College of China

基　　金：南京信息工程大学人文社会科学研究项目地方政府积极环境行为的法律规划(SK20090154)

摘　　要：排污权初始分配合理与否在很大程度上决定着市场交易能否持续,因而初始分配权利的合理配置是排污权交易制度设计的核心。初始分配中政府主导地位、政府失灵和公众参与的利益诉求决定了应该对政府权力加以约束,应该构筑以政府权力约束为核心,采取直接和间接权力约束方式的权利分配机制。同时,还应着重从环保问责制和环境公益诉讼两方面构建和完善初始分配中的权利救济制度。Reasonable initial assignment in tradable emissions rights determines the transaction can be continued, so the reasonable configuration of initial assignment rights is the core of the system design in tradable emissions rights. Government＇s main leading position, government failure and special participation interests of public decide that government power should be restricted and power distribution mechanisms should be established in which includes direct and indirect power constraint means. The remedy system of initial assignment rights also should be established and advanced from two sides of environmental accountability and environmental public interest litigation.

关 键 词：排污权交易 初始分配 权利配置 救济 

分 类 号：X323[环境科学与工程—环境工程]