限额存款保险与中国银行业的市场约束  

The Part Deposit Insurance and the Market Discipline of Chinese Banking

作　　者：马草原[1] 李运达[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济研究所,天津300071

出　　处：《金融论坛》2010年第8期20-27,共8页Finance Forum

摘　　要：一般认为,限额存款保险制度让存款人的资产部分地暴露于风险之中,从而市场约束虽然比无保险状态下较弱但仍然有效,因此世界上实行存款保险制度的国家多采用限额保险。本文认为,中国银行业特殊的股权结构,以及长期以来政府对大银行的资金支持形成了存款人"规模偏好"和银行"大而不倒"(too big to fail)的预期;这一预期特征必将异化市场约束,进而导致银行陷入无序的规模竞争并激励其风险承担;如果单纯实施限额存款保险制度,非但不能修正中国商业银行市场约束的异化问题,而且将强化公众的"大而不倒"预期,使市场约束面临更严重的扭曲。A general view is that part deposit insurance system makes depositor＇s property be partially exposed in risk, thereby market discipline is weaker than it on the non-insurance condition but still effective and most countries that implement deposit insurance system adopt part deposit insurance. The paper argues that the special ownership structure of Chinese banking industry and the government＇s financial support to big banks result in the expectations ＂scale preference＂ and ＂too big to fail＂. The expectations will break the market discipline, which leads bank into disorderly scale competition and stimulates bank to risk. If only the implementation of part deposit insurance system, the breaking of the Chinese commercial bank＇s market discipline can not be amended, the expectation ＂too big to fail＂ will also be strengthened and the market discipline will be more seriously distorted.

关 键 词：限额存款保险 隐性保险 规模偏好 市场约束 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学] F842F224