地方政府投资行为对经济长期增长的影响——来自中国经济转型的证据  被引量:65

The Local Government Investment Effects on Long-term Economic Growth——Evidence from China's Economic Transformation

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作  者:张卫国[1] 任燕燕[2] 侯永建 

机构地区:[1]山东社会科学院经济研究所,山东济南250002 [2]山东大学经济学院,山东济南250100 [3]招商银行零售银行部,广东深圳518040

出  处:《中国工业经济》2010年第8期23-33,共11页China Industrial Economics

基  金:山东省科学技术发展计划(软科学部分)重大项目"提升山东软实力的综合集成战略研究"(批准号2008RKA001);山东省自然科学基金项目"平行数据模型的有关问题研究"(批准号Y2007A03)

摘  要:本文基于中国29个省、区、市1987—2007年面板数据,实证检验了地方政府投资行为与经济长期增长的关系。一方面,地方政府投资行为对经济长期增长有着显著的促进作用。其中一个重要原因在于实行财政分权制度以来的激励机制强化使然,地方政府作为具有相对独立利益的经济主体更加积极地参与经济生活,通过采取多种方式努力吸引和扩大投资;为促进当地经济发展地方政府之间还展开竞争,地方政府间的竞争改善了投资的政策环境,也促进了市场机制的生成与发展,从而较为有力地促进了经济增长。另一方面,在1994年以后地方政府投资支出占GDP比重显著上升的情况下,各级地方政府对本级经济发展成果独享意愿明显增强,地方保护、市场分割等行政性垄断手段层出不穷,国内市场分割严重。实证结果表明现阶段市场分割对地区经济增长具有倒U型影响。这表明短期内地方政府有激励实施一定程度的行政垄断。然而,长期来看,行政性垄断不利于全国整体市场规模经济效应的发挥,政治租金的获得必然以损害经济的长期增长为代价。In this paper,we use Chinese provincial panel data from 1987 to 2007 to investigate the relationship between local government investment and long-term economic growth.On the one hand,local government investment significantly improves the economic growth.One important reason is the increasing of incentives after the fiscal division.As a relatively independent economic entity,local governments take part in economic lives more actively who make efforts to attract and increase investment.To prompt local economic growth,local governments also compete with each other which improve the investment environments as well as the building and development of economic mechanisms and ultimately boot local economic growth effectively.On the other hand,after the ratio of local government investment and GDP increasing significantly after 1994,local administrative monopoly means such as local protectionism and market segmentation are also very obvious.China’s inner market segmentation is serious.Our empirical result shows that China’s current market segmentation has the anti-U-shaped effects on economic growth while administrative monopoly increases growth for most provinces.This explains why China’s local governments still have incentives to take administrative monopolies nowadays.However,in long-term,administrative monopoly will certainly restrain the countrywide marketed scale effect as a whole.The pure political rents will be ultimately in cost of economic efficiency.

关 键 词:地方政府投资行为 经济长期增长 财政分权 行政性垄断 

分 类 号:F127[经济管理—世界经济]

 

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