Payoff-based accumulative effect promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma  

Payoff-based accumulative effect promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma

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作  者:刘永奎 李智 陈小杰 王龙 

机构地区:[1]Center for Complex Systems,Department of Automatic Control Engineering,Xidian University [2]State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems,Center for Systems and Control,College of Engineering,Peking University

出  处:《Chinese Physics B》2010年第9期53-58,共6页中国物理B(英文版)

基  金:supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos.70671079,60674050,60736022 and 60528007);the National Basic Research Program of China (Grant No.2002CB312200);the National High Technology Research and Development Program of China (Grant No.2006AA04Z258);11-5 Project (Grant No.A2120061303)

摘  要:We study the effect of accumulative payoff on the evolution of cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on a square lattice. We introduce a decaying factor for the accumulative payoff, which characterizes the extent that the historical payoff is accumulated. It is shown that for fixed values of the temptation to defect, the density of cooperators increases with the value of the decaying factor. This indicates that the more the historical payoff is involved, the more favourable cooperators become. In the critical region where the cooperator density converges to zero, cooperators vanish according to a power-law-like behaviour. The associated exponents agree approximately with the two-dimensional directed percolation and depend weakly on the value of the decaying factor.We study the effect of accumulative payoff on the evolution of cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on a square lattice. We introduce a decaying factor for the accumulative payoff, which characterizes the extent that the historical payoff is accumulated. It is shown that for fixed values of the temptation to defect, the density of cooperators increases with the value of the decaying factor. This indicates that the more the historical payoff is involved, the more favourable cooperators become. In the critical region where the cooperator density converges to zero, cooperators vanish according to a power-law-like behaviour. The associated exponents agree approximately with the two-dimensional directed percolation and depend weakly on the value of the decaying factor.

关 键 词:payoff accumulative effect prisoner's dilemma COOPERATION 

分 类 号:O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]

 

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