金融监管中的激励冲突、金融企业家行为与金融脆弱性  

The Incentive Conflicts,Behavior of Financial Entrepreneur and Financial Fragilities in Financial Regulation

作　　者：刘湘勤[1] 陈建华[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行西安分行,陕西西安710075 [2]中国人民银行,北京100800

出　　处：《上海金融》2010年第8期51-55,共5页Shanghai Finance

摘　　要：金融企业家是金融系统中最为活跃的能动因素,金融企业家利用系统中的非对称信息、金融市场参与者的心理偏差进行的市场操控、过度创新是导致金融脆弱性的微观基础;金融监管制度设计中的激励冲突是扭曲金融企业家行为进而导致金融脆弱性的制度根源。基于这一框架,本文对美国次贷危机成因进行了重新认识,并从监管激励冲突的角度分析了当前我国金融系统的脆弱性及其对我国金融监管体系改革的启示。Financial entrepreneur is the most active factor in financial system. The behaviors of financial entrepreneur such as market manipulation and over financial innovation, in a financial market with asymmetric information and psychological biases, is the foundation of financial fragilities; and the incentive conflicts in financial regulation design are the institutional cause of financial fragilities. Under this framework, this paper reconsiders the reason of subprime mortgage crisis in America and the fragilities of china＇s financial system.

关 键 词：金融监管 信息不对称 激励相容 金融脆弱性 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]