基于演化博弈理论的我国加盟连锁经营研究  

Study on Franchised Store Chain Operation in China Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：王玉燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东财政学院工商管理学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2010年第4期165-169,共5页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目基金资助(09YJC630141);山东省自然科学基金资助(ZR2009HQ002);山东财政学院博士科研启动资金资助(09BSJJ01)

摘　　要：作为一种现代化商业经营模式和组织形式,加盟连锁经过一百多年的发展,在全世界范围内取得了巨大的成功。目前,我国的加盟连锁便利店正处于快速发展阶段,逐步成为社会闲散资金投资热点。但是,对于加盟商加入连锁总部之后可能出现的"道德风险"问题却一直难以得到有效解决。本文运用演化博弈理论对我国连锁加盟的发展进行研究,结果指出在我国市场经济体系尚不完善的情况下,加强对连锁加盟的社会监管是促进该种经营方式良性发展的一种有效途径。As a modern business operating model and organizational form,franchised stores have deve loped for a hundred years and have been succesful tremendously throughout the world.At present,China＇s convenience chained stores have developed rapidly,and gradually attracted investment.However,the ＂moral risk＂ problem is difficult to solve that arises between the franchisee and the franchisor.In this paper,we study the development of Chinese chained stores based on evolutionary game theory,and the results point out that,under the condition that China＇s market economy system is not yet perfect,to strengthen social supervision is an effective way to promote the sound operation.

关 键 词：监管 加盟连锁 演化博弈 加盟商 

分 类 号：F717.6[经济管理—产业经济]