多维信息招投标中的最优机制及其实施  

Optimal mechanism and its implementation in multidimensional auctions

作　　者：王宏[1] 陈宏民[1] 杨剑侠[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2010年第8期1-14,共14页Journal of Management Sciences in China

摘　　要：引入广义质量的生产函数,把竞标企业所有关于质量的信息转化为综合性质量指标,求解了多维信息招投标中的最优机制,并证明了3阶段的第1分值拍卖和第2分值拍卖都能够有效实施该最优机制.在此基础上得到多维信息招投标中更具一般意义的收入等值原理:无论买者在事前是否承诺遵循某一评分规则,也无论实施的是第1分值拍卖还是第2分值拍卖,买者的期望收益都相等.进一步分析还表明,买者事前承诺遵循某一合适的评分规则有利于提高整体社会福利,否则会导致竞标企业的过度质量供给,这从整个社会来讲是非效率的.This paper converts all the bidders＇ quality information into a comprehensive quality index by employing the production function of generalized quality. Under this fundamental setting, we have solved the optimal mechanism for multidimensional auctions. Moreover, the results show that three stage first-score and second-seore auction can both implement this optimal mechanism efficiently. Based on this, we obtain the generalized revenue equivalence theorem in multidimensional auctions： whether the buyer commits to any scoring rule ex ante or not, or whether the first-score or second-score auction is implemented, the expected revenue of the buyer is equal. Further analysis shows that, if the buyer can commit to an appropriate scoring rule, the total social welfare can be improved; otherwise, it will cause bidders＇ excessive quality supply which is inefficient from the perspective of total social welfare.

关 键 词：多维信息招投标 分值拍卖 最优机制 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]