政府干预、股权性质和盈余操纵——基于首次发行股票的实证研究  

Government Intervention,Equity Property and Earning Management——Empirical Research on IPO

作　　者：李亚静[1] 朱宏泉[2] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054 [2]西南交通大学经济与管理学院,成都610031

出　　处：《软科学》2010年第8期58-64,69,共8页Soft Science

摘　　要：以在我国沪深两市上市的公司为研究对象,探讨在首次发行股票(IPO)过程中政府干预行为——批准持续经营时间不到三年的公司提前发行股票上市,对公司在IPO过程中盈余操纵行为的影响,以及政府干预与控股股东性质对盈余操纵的交互作用。实证分析发现:在IPO过程中,政府干预提前上市的公司呈现出比非政府干预上市公司有更严重的盈余操纵行为。在IPO过程中,政府干预的非国有控股的上市公司,呈现出了最严重的盈余操纵行为;非国有控股的非政府干预上市公司,呈现出了较严重的盈余操纵行为;国有控股的政府干预公司,呈现出了次严重的盈余操纵行为;国有控股的非政府干预上市公司,呈现出了最低的盈余操纵。This paper studies the impact of government intervention in IPO on companies＇ earning management in view of listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Markets, and researches interaction of government intervention, equity property and earning management. The finding shows that： listing in advance by the government shows more earning management than non-government＇ s invention in listed company. Non-state-controlled listed companies intervened by the government shows the most serious earning management in IPO; non-state-controlled listed companies intervened by non-government the relatively serious; state-controlled listed companies intervened by the government the less; state-controlled listed companies intervened by non-government the least.

关 键 词：首次发行股票 政府干预 控股股东 盈余操纵 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]