看法与论证  

Beliefs and Arguments

作　　者：陈嘉映[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]首都师范大学哲学系 [2]华东师范大学中国现代思想文化研究所

出　　处：《逻辑学研究》2010年第2期68-78,共11页Studies in Logic

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地2006年度重点项目<20世纪中国伦理学:问题与思考>;中国现代思想文化研究所资助

摘　　要：本文的主导问题是:我们为自己已经具有的看法进行论证是否多余甚至虚伪?为回答这一问题,我们需要澄清关于论证的一些误解。论证并不只是为了说服别人。从根本上说,论证是把东一处西一处的道理联系起来,使我们获得整体的眼光,或日综观。尽管我们在着手论证之前已经有为之进行论证的看法,但获得了论证的看法,在上述意义上,是一种新的看法。即使我们并没有通过论证达到"共识",论证也并非徒劳,因为它可能有助于多样性之间的相互理解。The central question of this article is： is argumentation （dianoesis） for beliefs we have already fostered superfluous, if not pretentious, efforts？ In order to answer this question, we need to clarity some misconceptions about the nature of argumentation. It is not the sole function of argumentation to get the audience change sides. Rather, argu- mentation qua dianoesis is in essence an effort to get dispersed understandings related and hence form an ＂overview＂. A belief becomes a new one in the above sense, although we already had the belief before arguing for it. Argumentation is not in vain even if it fails to achieve consensus among parties involved, for it may bring the parties to a deeper understanding of each other.

关 键 词：看法 论证 理据 共享经验 

分 类 号：B812[哲学宗教—逻辑学]