需求预测更新情形下的供应链Stackelberg博弈与协调研究  

Supplier-Buyer Stackelberg Game and Supply Chain Coordination with Demand Forecast Updating

作　　者：宋华明[1] 杨慧[1] 罗建强[1] 段子珺[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京理工大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210094

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2010年第4期86-92,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学资金资助项目(70872047);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金资助项目(07SJD630043)

摘　　要：在贝叶斯需求预测更新的情形下,从供需博弈角度探讨了易逝品供应链库存管理的基本问题:什么时间订、订多少以及订货价格如何决定。建立了制造商为主方、零售商为从方的供需Stackelberg博弈模型,其中制造商在低价多量与高价少量之间权衡,零售商在低成本低预测精度与高成本高预测精度之间进行权衡。分析了模型最优解的存在性,设计了两层规划的分段迭代算法,并通过数值例子说明了模型与算法的有效性。进一步,针对Stackelberg博弈中出现的双重边际效应,提出了实现供应链协调的契约形式,论证了实现供应链协调的条件。This paper investigates the basic issues in a perishable-product supply chain from the perspective of supplier-buyer staekelberg game with bayesian demand forecast updating, that is when to order, how many to order and what the wholesale price is. A stackelberg game model in which manufacturer is a leader and retailer is a follower is developed. In the model, the manufacturer trades off between order quantity and wholesale price, the retailer trades off between the crashing cost and forecast error. Existence of the optimal solution for the model is analyzed and a piecewise iterative algorithms is developed to solve the hi- level programming. At cast, and a numerical instance is given to validate the algorithm and model. Furthermore, a supply chain contract is put forward to coordinate the supply chain and alleviate the double margin in stackelberg game.

关 键 词：STACKELBERG博弈 两层规划 信息更新 供应链协调 契约 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]