双边道德风险、股权契约安排与相机谈判契约  

Double Moral Hazard,Equity Contract Designing,and Contingent Negotiation Contract

作　　者：殷林森[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海金融学院国际金融学院,上海201209

出　　处：《管理评论》2010年第8期10-18,29,共10页Management Review

基　　金：上海市教育发展基金会晨光计划(09CG68);上海市教育委员会重点学科建设项目(J51601)

摘　　要：基于创业投资双方的信息不对称,创业投资双方均不是完全意义的剩余索取权人,会产生双方努力行为不足、以及创业企业家谋取私人收益的视角,将私人收益与努力水平结合起来,进行综合考虑,比较分析了股权契约情况下,双方在信息完全与信息不完全两种情况下的努力水平,得出结论股权契约安排会产生双边道德风险。为解决这一问题,论文改变以往一直讨论的应该选择股权、债权或可转换债券等契约工具来降低双边道德风险的思路,得出结论:通过采取引入私人收益,并通过控制私人收益来间接激励双方的努力的思路,以实现降低或减缓双边道德风险的目的。The information asymmetry between venture capital partners who don＇t have residual claim of all rights will result in insufficient efforts of both partners and venture entrepreneurs＇pursuit for private benefits.From this point of view,this paper combines both private benefits and effort level into a comprehensive consideration.Under the equity contract arrangement,this paper compares the effort level of both complete information and incomplete information,and concludes that equity contract arrangement will lead to double moral hazard.In order to resolve the problem,this paper backs away from the traditional thoughts that always discuss which contracts,equity,debt or convertible securities to be chosen to avoid moral hazard,and instead comes up with a new solution of slowing down double moral hazard by introducing private benefits variable and controlling private benefits to indirectly motivate efforts of both partners.

关 键 词：双边道德风险 股权契约 私人收益 相机控制 谈判 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学] F224