基于博弈的技术转移与清洁发展机制捆绑  

Issue tying-in of technology transfers and clean development mechanism using game model

作　　者：张发树[1] 何建坤[2] 刘滨[1] 刘贞[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学能源环境经济研究所,北京100084 [2]清华大学低碳能源实验室,北京100084

出　　处：《清华大学学报（自然科学版）》2010年第9期1460-1463,共4页Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)

基　　金："十一五"国家科技支撑计划项目(2007BAC03A12)

摘　　要：为分析技术转移与清洁发展机制(CDM)捆绑的机制,利用博弈论模型方法,对捆绑交易及单独交易的均衡结果进行分析和对比,并探讨双重捆绑的技术——CDM机制的效果。研究表明:将技术转移与CDM进行捆绑可以扩展CDM,总体上是有利的。当二者不能独立交易时,捆绑合作是稳定的;但是,当二者能够独立交易时,只有当碳市场价格在一定范围内,捆绑合作才是稳定的。技术-CDM机制可以进一步扩展CDM,发展中国家可以用减排量换取发达国家的技术转移,从而实现发达国家、发展中国家和全球气候的三方共赢。Game modeling is used to analyze the mechanism of tying-in technology transfers and clean development mechanism（CDM）.This study analyzes the equilibrium results of tied-in transaction and separate transactions and the effects of dual tying-in technology clean development mechanism（TCDM） mechanism.Tying-in of technology transfer and CDM extends CDM and is beneficial overall.Tying-in cooperation is stable when the two transactions cannot be implemented independently.However,when the two transactions can be implemented independently,the cooperation is stable only if the carbon price is within a certain range.The TCDM mechanism further extends the CDM,by developing countries exchanging emission reductions for technology transfers from developed countries,to achieve a win-win-win scenario for developed and developing countries and the global climate.

关 键 词：博弈模型 技术转移 清洁发展机制 问题捆绑 气候变化 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]