政府干预、GDP增长与地方国企过度投资  

Government Intervention,GDP Growth and Local SOE Overinvestment

作　　者：唐雪松[1] 周晓苏[2] 马如静[3] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院,成都610074 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300071 [3]西南财经大学金融学院,成都610074

出　　处：《金融研究》2010年第8期33-48,共16页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70802050);国家社会科学基金项目(07CJY013和10CJL038);西南财经大学211工程三期项目;青年教师成长项目(211QN09009)的资助

摘　　要：本文研究地方国企投资中政府干预的动因以及相应后果。以上市公司(2000～2006)为样本研究表明,为了实现当地GDP增长,地方政府干预导致了地方国企过度投资;在市场化进程越慢的地区或GDP增长相对业绩表现越差时,政府干预动机越强烈,使该地区国企过度投资问题越严重。而且,政府干预并未因政府持股方式变化而改变,政府间接持股的与直接持股的地方国企同样地受到政府干预而发生过度投资。本文结论也为近年来中国的政府官员政绩考核模式转变提供支持。This paper investigates the motivation of government to intervene in local SOE investment and its consequences. Using the sample of listed companies from 2000 to 2006, we find that government interventions bring about local SOE overinvestment for the purpose of GDP growth. In the regions with slow marketization pace, or when the performance of GDP growth is relatively poor, the government interventions become stronger, and the problems of local SOE overinvestment are hkely to he more severe. What＇s more, government interventions do not change with the variety of SOE shareholding style. The SOEs indirectly controLled by government have the same levd of overinvestment as those SOEs controlled directly by government. The resuhs also provide supports for the reform of Chinese officer performance appraisement mode.

关 键 词：过度投资 政府干预 GDP增长 

分 类 号：G30[文化科学] G31