基于可信可控网络的流量工程与覆盖网路由的合作博弈模型  

A Cooperative Game Model for Traffic Engineering and Overlay Routing Based on Trustworthy and Controllable Network

作　　者：王鹏[1] 罗军舟[1] 李伟[1] 曲延盛[1] 于枫[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学计算机科学与工程学院,南京210096

出　　处：《计算机学报》2010年第9期1663-1674,共12页Chinese Journal of Computers

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(60903161;60903162;90912002);国家"九七三"重点基础研究发展规划项目基金(2010CB328104);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金(200802860031);江苏省自然科学基金(BK2008030);江苏省"网络与信息安全"重点实验室(BM2003201);"计算机网络和信息集成"教育部重点实验室基金(93K-9)资助~~

摘　　要：传统网络中的流量工程和覆盖网络路由之间存在的目标冲突问题严重影响了网络的效率和稳定性.针对该问题,文中在可信可控网络模型的基础上提出了流量工程与覆盖网路由合作博弈模型,将其转化为一个静态Nash讨价还价问题,给出了模型的帕累托最优解,并实现了对流量工程和覆盖网路由的一次性配置.与以往的解决方法相比,该模型的解具有帕累托最优性,提高了底层网络和覆盖网的性能;通过一次性完成对流量工程和覆盖网路由的配置,该模型完全避免了传统方法引起的路由翻动现象,提高了网络的稳定性.仿真实验结果表明,文中提出的方法优于解决同样问题的已有方法.The objective conflict between traffic engineering in native network and overlay rou ting in overlay network influences the efficiency and stability of network. To solve this problem, this paper proposes a cooperative game model for traffic engineering and overlay routing based on Trustworthy and Controllable Network, which converted the objective conflict problem between traffic engineering and overlay routing into a Nash Bargaining Problem. The Pareto optimal solution to the problem is given, and the configurations to traffic engineering and overlay routing are completed at one time. Comparing with the prior methods, this model improves the efficiency of network by the Pareto optimal solution; and because the model completes the configurations to native traffic and overlay routing at one time, it completely avoids the route flaps caused by the continuous interaction between traffic engineering and overlay routing, and improves the stability of the network. The experiment result has verified that the method has better performance than prior methods.

关 键 词：可信可控网络 合作博弈 流量工程 覆盖网路由 帕累托最优解 

分 类 号：TP393[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]