基于转换成本和两类用户的多市场竞争:以电力零售市场为例  

Multi-market competition with switching cost and two category consumers:On the example of electrical retail market

作　　者：胡汉辉[1] 吕魁[1,2] 万兴[3] 胡绪华[1,4] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学集团经济与产业组织研究中心,南京210096 [2]南京审计学院审计信息工程重点实验室,南京211815 [3]南京财经大学产业发展研究院,南京210046 [4]江苏大学财经学院,镇江212013

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2010年第9期1545-1553,共9页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(70833002);国家自然科学基金(70873019)

摘　　要：发展了考虑忠实用户和转换成本的不对称双寡头价格竞争模型,分析了电力零售市场中在位售电商跨区域多市场竞争策略.在输配电业务与售电业务剥离后,市场竞争强度和竞争策略仍然受到在位售电商不对称的忠实用户基础和活跃用户转换成本的影响,难以达到完全竞争的状态.模型和算例分析表明,在忠实用户份额的影响下,均衡的期望价格并非转换成本的递增函数.大公司忠实用户份额较大时,降低转换成本有可能导致市场势力的上升,而大公司忠实用户份额不太大时,较低转换成本下的双向进入市场定价也有可能高于单向进入时的期望价格.The multi-market competition strategies of the incumbent electrical retailer across areas are analyzed in the electrical retail market based on the model of asymmetric duopoly price competition. After the separation of the transmission, distribution and sales of electricity, competition intensity and strategies are impacted by the share of loyal consumers and switching cost of active consumers, which make perfect competition difficulty. The results of the model and numerical examples show that expect equilibrium price is not the increasing function of switching cost. The decrease of switching cost may increase the market power as the loyal consumers share of the big company is high, while the price under bilateral access with low switching cost may higher than the expect price under unilateral access with high that as the loyal consumers share of the big company is not too high.

关 键 词：转换成本 忠实用户 电力零售市场 多市场竞争 

分 类 号：F123.9[经济管理—世界经济] TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]